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Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win 
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose. 
Bernard Brodie, 1946 
~h~ power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy-
VICious diplomacy, but diplomacy. 
Thomas Schelling, 1966 
The nuclear _weapon has been referred to as the absolute or ultimate weapon be-
ca~se of ~he incomparable devastation packed by a nuclear warhead and the speed 
w1th :-"h1ch such devastation can be delivered.! Its advent was widely perceived as 
mar~1ng a new ~poch in warfare, making for a revolution in thinking about war 
and m the relationship between war and politics with far-reaching implications 
f~r the role of force as an instrument of state policy and for the conduct of poli-
tics amon_g_ nuclear weapon states (Brodie 1946, 1959, 1973; Jervis 19s9; Schelling · 
1_966). ~1htary strategists, who tended to see the nuclear weapon in the tradi-
tional vem as a better and more effective bomb, contested the view that nuclear 
we~pons brought about a paradigmatic change in thinking about war and politics 
(Fnedb.erg. 1_982). Others, such as William Borden (1946), saw atomic weapons as 
revoluuomzmg strategy by elevating the tactical above the strategic; he asserted 
~hat "the key t~ victory lies in defeating hostile military forces," not in hitting cit-
Ies a.nd mdustnal centers to lay waste the war-making potential of a country. The 
tension between these competing viewpoints framed the many debates on U.S. 
nuclear st~ategy during the Cold War. American strategic doctrine as observed by 
Aaron Fnedberg (1982) "always contained two strands." One was assured retali-
ation that emphasized countervalue deterrence. The second was the more tradi-
tional strand that focused on war outcomes should deterrence faiL 
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Nevertheless, the view that nuclear weapons had a transforming effect came 
to dominate strategic thinking especially in the civilian strategic community that 
became influential in the 196os in framing U.S. nuclear strategy. Robert Jervis's . 
(1989) central claim that nuclear weapons had dramatically altered statecraft, be-
cause force and the threat of force could not support foreign policy as they did in 
previous eras, reflected widespread thinking among civilian and military strategic 
thinkers. This chapter outlines the transforming logic of nuclear weapons and 
explores at a conceptual level the roles of nuclear weapons, the strategies for their 
employment, and their implications for international security to provide a histori-
cal and conceptual perspective for the investigation of these issues in the country 
and concluding chapters that follow. 
Transforming Effect 
Three characteristics of the nuclear weapon underlie its transforming or rev-
olutionary effect: one is the speed and incomparable devastation; second is the 
lack of defense against a nuclear weapon; and third is its punitive character. As 
Bernard Brodie (1946, 1959) and Thomas Schelling (1966) pointed out graphi-
cally, what is new is not the quantum of damage itself but the speed, efficiency, 
and economy with which it can be delivered. Cities and strategic industrial assets 
could be destroyed and a country paralyzed rather quickly by a small number 
of nuclear bombs. Absolute damage became the primary consideration; relative 
damage, important in earlier times in the cost-benefit calculation of war, ap-
peared less important, even irrelevant. The second key characteristic is that there 
· is no significant defense against the missiles that carry nuclear warheads or against 
the devastation caused by nuclear weapons and their lingering effects. States pos-
sessing nuclear weapons can destroy each other (mutual kill) without victory in 
the battlefield. The state and society are highly vulnerable in a nuclear attack; 
protection of strategic assets and society becomes crucial but also highly difficult 
or impossible. The significance of nuclear weapons, as Brodie (1959: 173) asserted 
"depends above all on the possibility of defense against them in a strategic attack." 
Third, nuclear weapons are punitive in character (Schelling 1966: 33-34). Their 
significance lies in the power to hurt (kill hundreds of thousands of people and 
. destroy strategic assets quickly), not in holding or taking ground or other assets of 
value. Taken together these characteristics have far-reaching implications for the 
purpose and employment of force as an instrument of state policy. 
Limit War as an Instrument of Policy 
Total war between nuclear weapon states can serve no conceivable political 
purpose. Victory in such a war would be meaningless, as both parties to the con-
flict would suffer irreparable damage; recovery would be slow and take many 
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years or may be impossible. With no defense available, each would be able to 
inflict damage on the other. Mutual vulnerability (later associated with the pos-
session of mutual second-strike capability) implied that no nuclear weapon state 
could impose its will on another through total war. This underscored Brodie's : 
famous assertion that the chief purpose of military establishments is no longer 
to win wars but to prevent (deter) them (1946: 76). The impossibility of military 
victory in total war led some, including Brodie for a brief period, to assert that 
nuclear weapons had invalidated Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a con- ·. 
tinuation of policy by other means. 2 
The view that war had ceased to be a rational instrument of policy among 
nuclear weapon states was challenged on two grounds. First, although total war 
could no longer be a rational instrument, it was argued that limited war using 
conventional weapons could still be waged and serves that function. The idea of 
limited war later extended to include limited nuclear war to serve intrawar deter-
rence and war fighting functions in a strategy of conflict escalation. Limited wars 
were seen as more likely and having greater consequences than before (Kissinger 
1957). Still the potential for escalation oflimited war to total war among nuclear. 
weapon states induced caution and set limits to the role of war as an instrument 
policy among nuclear weapon states (Jervis 1989: 19-22). 
The second challenge came from those who posited that although military vic-
tory was impossible in a nuclear war, nuclear weapons can serve important politi- · 
cal ends (Schelling 1966; Kahn 1961). They argued that the threat of punishment' 
and the manipulation of that risk had political-diplomatic value and should be 
exploited. Even exemplary forcible action, they argued, may have to be contem-, 
plated to demonstrate resolve and the threat of more pain to come. Utility can be 
derived from the threatened use of nuclear weapons to protect the nuclear weapon 
state's homeland, that of its allies, as well as to protect other vital interests and the 
international status quo. Others argued that limited nuclear war is a viable nuclear 
strategy that with appropriate diplomacy provides a means to escape the "steril-
ity of the quest for absolute peace ... and ... of the search for absolute victory" 
(Kissinger 1957). Because of their limited or lack of utility in a military sense and 
the political utility derived from their threatened use, nuclear weapons came to be 
seen essentially as a political rather than a military weapon. 
Threat of Punishment to the Fore 
The punitive character of nuclear weapons and the lack of defense against nu-
clear weapons shifted the emphasis in the role of force in policy and strategy 
from actual use to threatened use (Schelling 1966). The devastating consequences 
rendered the rational use of nuclear weapons unthinkable, but the threat of devas-
tating punishment became highly potent and became the mainstay of policy and 
strategy in the nuclear era. The salience of force shifted from use on the battlefield 
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to coercive threat to inflict unacceptable damage and pain. 3 This shift has several 
important implications. 
First, it elevates the salience of deterrence and downgrades that of defense and 
offense. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is oflittle use in defense (hold-
ing ground and defeating an attacking enemy, denying assets of value to the en-
emy) or in offense (attacking and defeating an enemy in the battlefield to acquire 
assets of value-land, population, resources, etc.). Its primary role is to deter at-
tack by threatening devastating consequences. This elevates deterrence from a 
way station to war in the conventional era to the centerpiece of strategy in the 
nuclear era (Freedman 1983, 2004). During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence be-
came the cornerstone of national security strategy and international politics. The 
lack of defense against nuclear weapons and possession of mutual second-strike 
· capability-the ability to inflict absolute pain and extinction on each other re-
gardless of who strikes first-decouples deterrence from defense.4 Nuclear weap-
.ons make for a sharp distinction between "deterrence by denial" and "deterrence 
by punishment" (Snyder 1961: 8-9, 14-16). Nuclear weapons reduce the potency 
of the former and dramatically elevate the importance of the latter. Deterrence is 
the central function of nuclear weapons and has come to exclusively mean deter-
rence by threat of punishment. 
Second, the shift to the threatened use of force focuses attention on the ad-
versary's intentions. Traditional military strategy focused almost exclusively on 
capability. A certain level of capability to carry out the articulated threat still 
· remains crucial in the nuclear era; however, the significance of superiority beyond 
a certain level of retaliatory capability is much less important, possibly even ir-
relevant. The credibility of a nuclear threat depends not only on capability but 
also on influencing an adversary's perception and intention (Schelling 1966: 35). 
. Issues relating to the credibility of threat including the "art of commitment" and 
"manipulation of risk" become highly important. 
Finally, the threat of punishment has connected violence and diplomacy in 
novel ways that is vividly captured in the "diplomacy of violence" phrase coined 
by Schelling (1966). Diplomacy was always connected to the possible use of vio-
lence as demonstrated by phrases such as gunboat diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. 
However, diplomacy and force were distinct instruments that were considered 
alternatives, with force used when diplomacy failed. In the nuclear era, the threat 
and use of violence itself can be seen as an instrument of diplomacy. The danger 
and threat of nuclear war could be exploited as an important technique of influ-
ence, bargaining, and intimidation. 
Nuclear Weapon Roles 
Discussion of the roles of nuclear weapons must begin with Clausewitz's central 
insight that "war is a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of 
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other means," and that its purpose and conduct must be influenced by the political 
objective (1976: 605-IO). Rather than negate Clausewitz's insight, the immense 
destruction potential of nuclear weapons highlights the importance of discussing 
the purposes, roles, and limitations of these ultimate weapons in relation to de-
sired political objectives and the prevailing political-strategic context. Even total 
war must be part of policy. A criticism leveled against "second-wave" strategic . 
analysts was that their thinking was largely apolitical and abstract (Trachtenberg 
1989). Abstract thinking is important for conceptualization and theorizing, but 
such thinking must be infused with political considerations when contemplating 
the role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy. 
States resort to the threat and use of force for three basic political ends: to pre-
serve their existence, to enhance state power to achieve national foreign policy 
goals including that of shaping the international environment (milieu goals), and 
to maintain international order. 5 In an anarchic system, survival is precarious and 
highly contingent and is the basic goal of states. State survival entails protecting 
territorial integrity, preserving internal sovereignty (compulsory internal juris-
diction), and preserving international sovereignty (independence and autonomy 
in decision making). Informed by zero-sum distributional consequences, security 
is a scarce value, and the quest for it through competitive armament creates a se-
curity dilemma (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978). Pursuit of foreign policy objectives, in-
cluding shaping the international environment, may require both preserving and 
altering the status quo, including protecting allies and friends, securing access to 
vital resources, denying them to adversaries, and prevailing in regional conflicts. 
The third goal of maintaining international order, which overlaps with shaping 
the international environment, includes domination (power and authority) to en-
sure a certain type of order and the construction of domestic regimes and inter-
national organizations in support of that order. 6 Traditionally, military force has 
been assigned a primary role in the pursuit of all three goals. What is the role of 
the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of these three 
basic goals? 
As observed earlier, the punitive character of nuclear weapons and the lack of 
defense against them elevate deterrence and downgrade offense and defense. The 
primary function of nuclear weapons is to ensure survival and preserve the status 
quo by deterring aggression (deterrence) and compelling an adversary not to em-
bark on or to undo a transgression that seeks change in the status quo (compel-
lence). The threat of punishment, the danger of escalation to nuclear war, and the 
exemplary use of force may be exploited in an offensive role to compel or prevent a 
change in the status quo (coercive diplomacy or limited war), or to destroy an en-
emy's strategic assets (counterforce). The counterforce role can also serve a damage 
limitation function and be viewed as defensive. These roles are elaborated below. 
Exploring Roles 
Deterrence 
Although deterrence has been employed in many ways (as a concept, a theory, 
and a strategy), my concern here is with the function of deterrence in a political-
security role to deter aggression by threatening unacceptable punishment. Deter-
rence has a status quo orientation. The threat intent in deterrence is to keep the 
.. enemy from starting something. Types of deterrence may be distinguished on 
· the basis of the referent unit for protection (who is to be protected), against what 
threats, and how deterrence is to be prosecuted. On who is to be protected, two 
rypes of deterrence may be identified. One is basic or central deterrence, which is the 
protection of the nuclear state's homeland by deterring outright military attack 
. through threat of unacceptable consequences (Freedman 2004). The second is ex-
tended deterrence. This refers to the extension of the deterrence function of a state's 
nuclear arsenal to protect the homeland of an ally. Extended deterrence could also 
be applied more broadly to the protection of a nuclear weapon state's vital interests 
(maintaining a sphere of influence, protecting sea lines of communications) that 
lie outside the territory of an ally. 
The question of what is to be deterred is more complicated. In the early 
years of the Cold War, it was believed that nuclear weapons could deter a wide 
range of threats, including direct nuclear attack, large-scale conventional attack, 
limited conventional attack and intrusion, low-intensity war, and biological and 
chemical attack. Progressively, however, it became clear, especially with the de-
. velopment of parity and mutual second-strike capabilities, that nuclear weapons 
could deter only a narrow range of threats and that other deterrents were essen-
tial to cope with lesser threats and plug the widening gap in deterrence policy 
(Huntington 1982; Kauffman 1956). The how question relates to strategy and is 
discussed later. 
Finally, although it has to be in place and working all the time, deterrence 
may be general or immediate (Morgan 2003). The difference between the two is 
in the intensity of the threat and the readiness to execute the threat. Immediate 
deterrence is a crisis situation in which war is distinctly possible; general deter-
rence is "far less intense and anxious because the attack to be forestalled is still 
hypothetical" (Morgan 2003: 9). Nevertheless, general deterrence is a situation in 
which an opponent would consider attacking if a suitable occasion arose, but does 
not proceed beyond preliminary consideration of this option in light of the threat 
of retaliation posed by the other party (Morgan 200~: So). In general deterrence, 
"an actor maintains a broad military capability and issues broad threats of punitive 
response" to prevent anyone from thinking seriously about attacking. In immedi-
ate deterrence, an actor has developed specific capabilities and issues threats to an 
opponent who is preparing to attack. 
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Compellence 
In contrast to deterrence, which is passive, compellence is an irrevocable com-
mitment to action that can only cease when the adversary complies with a de-
mand.? The threat of nuclear punishment is deployed to change the behavior 
of a state by affecting its cost-benefit calculus, usually to compel an enemy to 
stop or undo a certain course of action that he is embarked on (Schelling 1966: 
69-78). A compellence threat involves initiation of a commitment or action and a 
clear deadline by which the adversary must respond. Should the opponent fail to 
comply, the initiator must be committed to carry through the stated action if the 
threat is to be credible. 
Coercive Diplomacy 
Alexander George defines coercive diplomacy broadly to include both defensive 
and offensive use of force. 8 However, most Western analysts focus on the defen-
sive role of coercive diplomacy-" efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or 
undo an action he is already embarked upon" (George 2004: 71). The defense 
orientation of coercive diplomacy in the literature privileges the status quo and 
may be a function of viewing it essentially through the lens of U.S. policy in the 
Cold War (Freedman 2004: 109-10). In this study, coercive diplomacy is defined 
broadly to also include the use of coercion (including exploitation of the danger 
of escalation to nuclear war) to bring about change in the status quo, to compel 
changes in the policies of an adversary, or to support other foreign policy objec-
tives. Treating the risk of nuclear war as a shield, a state may pursue political ob-
jectives including intimidation and blackmail or compelling another state to ne-
gotiate on a particular issue by engaging in lower-level violence (conventional or 
low-intensity war) and threatening nuclear war. The threat and use of violence 
become infused with diplomacy. 
Counterforce Role 
In the counterforce role, nuclear weapons would be used to destroy or drasti-
cally impair an opponent's strategic force and other key military targets (such as 
massed troop formations, large military complexes, hardened military installa-
tions, and communication centers). Nuclear weapons may be used in a counter-
force role for deterrence, damage limitation, and in support of an assertive foreign 
policy (Glaser and Fetter 2005). By denying a survivable retaliatory capability, 
counterforce capabilities can enhance deterrence. In the event deterrence fails, 
such capabilities (especially a second strike) can limit damage to a state's own as-
sets and society by destroying enemy strategic assets. An ability to destroy enemy 
strategic assets would liberate foreign policy from the constraints arising from en-
emy possession of nuclear weapons. Although the benefits of counterforce against 
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the Soviet Union were ambiguous, it is argued that these benefits are more cer-
tain and useful for a country like the United States facing small nuclear powers 
(Buchan et al. 2003: 41-43). The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identif1es 
counterforce as a key role for nuclear weapons. Together with ballistic missile 
defense (BMD), it is seen as "bringing into better balance U.S. stakes and risks in 
a regional confrontation and thus reinforcing the credibility of U.S. guarantees 
designed to deter attacks on allies and friends" (2002 NPR: 14, quoted in Glaser 
and Fetter 2005: ro8). The distinction in the use of the counterforce role in de-
terrence and damage limitation lies in the purpose rather than in the nature of 
military action. It is thus subject to misperception. Glaser and Fetter argue that 
the counterforce role has limited deterrence value for a country that already has 
a strong second-strike capability and that it could be counterproductive in the 
conduct of foreign policy relating to regional conflicts. They see the chief value of 
the counterforce role in damage limitation. 
Preserving Strategic Autonomy 
A nuclear weapon state could coerce and constrain the policy choices of a non-
nuclear weapon state (either ally or foe) or could compel it into submission in 
certain conflict situations. To avoid such situations and to preserve autonomy in 
international relations, states may view nuclear weapons (their own or those of an 
ally) as vital to their national security and as a backstop to their foreign policy. A 
primary concern of a nonnuclear weapon state is avoiding blackmail by a nuclear 
weapon state in an adversarial situation. Although some nuclear weapon states 
have articulated a no-first-use (NFU) policy and pledged that they will not em-
ploy nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states, those who could be on 
the receiving end do not take such pledges seriously. Forging an alliance with a 
substantial nuclear weapon state can alleviate this concern, although that arrange-
ment may also constrain freedom of action. 
Power and Prestige 
Military power has always been an index of national power and prestige. Seen 
as the ultimate weapon, the possession of nuclear force may confer international 
power and status (membership in an exclusive club and big-power status) or en-
hance a state's international prestige (authority and legitimacy) (Gilpin 1981). Of-
ten Western analysts, especially in the arms control community, deprecate this 
role by assigning it a negative connotation in regard to nuclear weapon states and 
aspirants from the developing world. However, it is undeniable that countries 
such as the former Soviet Union, Britain, and France also viewed possession of 
nuclear weapons as necessary indicators of their international power and pres-
tige. It is possible to argue that nuclear weapons no longer serve this function in 
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the post-Cold War world in which the significance of military power including 
nuclear weapons is declining relative to other indexes of power (Paul 1998). 
Relationship to Conventional Capabilities 
The connection between nuclear and conventional forces is important in un.:. 
derstanding the contemporary roles of nuclear weapons and their significance in · 
the overall national security policy of a state. As noted in the Introduction chap-
ter, states that possess nuclear weapons are also modernizing their conventional 
military capabilities. The United States, for example, seeks to reduce its reliance 
on nuclear weapon capabilities by developing ballistic missile defense and more 
lethal conventional capabilities that can perform missions that were previously 
assigned to nuclear weapons. The old nuclear strategic triad is only one leg in 
Washington's new triad envisaged in the 2002 NPR. However, the United States 
also contemplates modern nuclear weapon capabilities for certain military pur-
poses such as earth penetration. Russia, on the other hand, in light of its weak-
nesses in conventional capabilities, emphasizes the centrality of nuclear weapons 
for its international security. For most other nuclear weapon states and their allies, 
conventional capability is the more relevant means to deal with the immediate se-
curity challenges confronting them. Nuclear weapons serve other functions. The 
division of labor between the two capabilities, how they reinforce or constrain 
each other, and their respective weight in national security policy are important 
issues to investigate. 
Redressing conventional power imbalance in a relatively cheap way is at times · 
advanced as a separate purpose of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, nu-
clear weapons were perceived by China as a cost-effective way to deter the vastly 
stronger United States and Soviet Union (Goldstein 2000). And American policy 
makers sought to counter Soviet conventional superiority in Europe and North 
Korean conventional superiority on the Korean peninsula with the deployment of 
tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons. The purpose, however, was still 
deterrence. Compensating for weakness in conventional military capability is not 
a separate purpose in itself, but a means to an end-deterrence. 
Apart from their role in dealing with certain security challenges for which nu-
clear weapons would not be relevant, conventional capabilities could be employed 
in conjunction with nuclear weapons in three ways. One conventional military ·• 
force may be deployed to prevent a fait accompli by a blitzkrieg-type attack by 
the adversary and enhance the effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence.9 This 
was the purpose of conventional forces in Europe and South Korea during the · 
Cold War. The deployment of U.S. conventional forces in these theaters also 
served as a visible symbol of U.S. commitment and a trip-wire function to trigger 
stronger reaction including nuclear retaliation. Second, and this is linked to the 
frrst point, for situations in which nuclear threats seem disproportional, the threat 
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of conventional retaliation provides a credible alternative, preventing the stark 
choice between all and nothing. Conventional capability may be incorporated 
into escalation and war-fighting strategies. Third, conventional forces could be 
employed in a coercive diplomacy role, including limited war to pursue certain 
political objectives based on the assumption that the fear of escalation to nuclear 
war would deter large-scale conventional retaliation. Limited war in the shadow 
of the nuclear umbrella was and is envisaged in this context. 
Nuclear Strategies 
Connecting ends-and-means strategy formulates how military force will be 
employed in the pursuit of desired political outcomes. Correctly formulated, it 
can function as a force multiplier (Betts 2ooo). Some have questioned the utility of 
strategy. Criticisms include the absence of criteria for selecting a strategy, the dif-
:ficulty of prediction in light of the complexity and contingency of war, difficulties 
GOmmunicating across cultures, and implementation problems. Often strategies 
are developed in an ad hoc manner and in hindsight to rationalize or provide an 
intellectual framework for a situation that already exists. Even if strategy is driven 
by specific purposes, the purposes themselves may not be clear, and there may be 
multiple and conflicting objectives. Further, there may be a wide gap between 
declaratory strategy, actual capability, and behavior in a crisis situation. In light of 
these problems, it could be argued that strategy cannot be meaningful. However, 
discussion of strategy is still necessary and useful because it provides the rationale 
for meaningful use of violence and threat of it as an instrument of state policy, and 
it indicates the international orientation and overall military posture of a state. 
Other states infer intent from the orientation of a state's strategy and behavior 
(Posen 1984). Strategies also affect the quality of international life, with conse-
quences for security interaction, the nature and intensity of the security dilemma, 
and the type of security order. 
Military strategy in the prenuclear era emphasized the achievement of political 
goals by winning wars. With the advent of nuclear weapons, as noted earlier, the 
emphasis in strategy shifted from the physical use of force to the threat and exem-
plary use of force to achieve political and military objectives. This shift under-
pins Brodie's claim that nuclear weapons revolutionized military strategy. Thomas 
Schelling (1966: r-34) extends this further by arguing that the growing centrality 
of power to hurt without "collapsing [the enemy's) military force," implies that 
military strategy is no longer about winning wars but about the "art of coercion, 
of intimidation and deterrence," and "of manipulating risk" to achieve certain 
political outcomes. 
Drawing on the Cold War experience but also on recent scholarship, this sec-
tion outlines the main nuclear strategies and their key elements. The selection of 
specific roles and strategies would be a function of the political objectives of the 
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state, its political-strategic position in the international system, and its satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction with it. A revisionist state seeking to bring about change in 
the international system would most likely emphasize offense-oriented roles and 
strategies. By contrast, a state that is concerned about its own survival or satisfied 
with the status quo is likely to emphasize deterrence and defensive roles and strat-
egies (Posen 1984). 
Strategies of Deterrence 
Nuclear deterrence seeks to prevent enemy aggression by threatening awful 
consequences usually labeled .as unacceptable damage. For a strategy of deter-
rence to be effective, a state must commit to a political outcome that is vital, 
threaten unacceptable damage if that outcome is jeopardized, have the capability 
to inflict such damage, and communicate the seriousness of its intention through 
a clear policy, firm commitment, and a reputation for carrying out commitments 
(Morgan 2003: 13-19; Schelling 1966: 35-91). Nuclear deterrence thinking has 
gone through different phases, and there has been a proliferation of adjectives to 
convey specific situations or orientations.l0 Some of these, such as existential deter-
rence, recessed deterrence, opaque deterrence, and mutual assured destruction (MAD), are 
situations or conditions, not strategies. Here, I discuss three primary strategies of 
basic or central deterrence-massive retaliation, assured retaliation, and mini-
mum deterrence-and the strategy of extended deterrence. At base, all three basic 
deterrence strategies are similar in that they rely on the threat of punishment. 
They differ on the retaliatory capability (and by extension the size of the nuclear 
arsenal) required to deter, the degree of desired certainty, and the threats to be 
deterred or contingencies to be covered. 
Massive Retaliation. First articulated in 1954 after the Korean War, this strategy 
was taken to imply that communist or communist-inspired aggression anywhere 
in the world would result in massive retaliation by the United States.11 The threat 
of massive retaliation was considered important to supplement local ground de-
fense and avoid worldwide commitment of U.S. ground forces and to reduce the 
cost of defense. It was also seen as providing flexibility in decision making because 
it allowed the United States to decide when and how to respond (Kauffman 1956). 
This strategy, which sought to maximize the utility of the special asset of the 
United States, was controversial from the outset. 
Formulated in the context of American nuclear superiority, the United States 
clearly had the requisite capability to carry out the strategy of massive retaliation. 
However, the strategy was deemed not credible on several counts, most impor-
tantly on the proportionality of response to threat (Kauffman 1956). It was con-
sidered credible only in regard to a very narrow range of contingencies, including 
the use of nuclear weapons by communist powers and direct attacks on the United 
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States and its key allies in Western Europe. The idea of a single deterrent to cope 
with a wide range of threats appears to have been a nonstarter from the outset. 
Assured Retaliation. The strategy of assured retaliation (also known as assured de-
struction) was derived from a critique of the strategy of massive retaliation and in 
of Soviet advances in strategic arms that supposedly neutralized American 
· nuclear superiority.12 The assured retaliation strategy seeks to deter a. deliber~te 
attack "by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable abthty to m-
fUct an unacceptable degree of damage upon any [and all] aggressors-even after 
·. · a first strike" (Enthoven and Smith 1971, quoted in Freedman 1983: 
246). The emphasis in this strategy is on surviving a first strike with the capabil-
ity to execute a retaliatory threat to inflict unacceptable damage (counte:value 
targeting to destroy cities and populations). A secure second-strike capabthty ~ 
· essential for an effective assured retaliation strategy. During the Cold War, thts 
translated into a requirement for a large nuclear arsenal; a strategic triad ofland, 
air, and sea assets; force protection; and sophisticated command, control, commu-
nications, and intelligence arrangements. The strategy was seen as credible against 
nuclear threats to the United States but less so in regard to key allies in Europe 
· and Asia. Conventional military force, tactical nuclear weapons, and intermediate 
range missiles were deemed essential to shore up the deterrence commitment to 
allies. Along with damage limitation and conventional defense, assured retahatwn 
fOrmed a part of the U.S. flexible response policy that was designed to provide 
policy makers with options in dealing with different contingencies. 
With advances in Soviet nuclear capability, a situation of MAD became a real-
ity. As Jervis (1989) points out, MAD was not a strategy but a fact: a condition 
that developed as a consequence of the ease of countervalue retaliation (as oppo~ed 
tocounterforce damage limitation) and the development of secure second-stnke 
capabilities by both superpowers. Though not preferred, vulnerability t~ ~utual 
retaliation came to be seen as essential for the stability of deterrence. It lS tmpor-
. tant to distinguish between MAD and assured retaliation. Although the end of 
. the Cold War has undermined the MAD situation, the strategy of assured retali-
ation continues to be relevant for and among countries that possess the capability 
to retaliate after suffering a first strike. 
Minimum Deterrence. The strategy of minimum deterrence rests on the belief that 
only a small nuclear force is required to deter nuclear and full-scale conventional 
attack. Absolute rather than relative level of damage is what matters, and nuclear 
balance and deployment are not as critical as they are in the strategy of assured 
retaliation. Nuclear threats are considered highly effective. The risk that nuclear 
. weapons would be used either in retaliation or in the escalation of a conventional 
war, and the high level of absolute damage (countervalue) that can be caused even 
by a small number of nuclear weapons, lies at the heart of minimum deterrence 
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(Basrur 2006; Freedman 1983). A minimum deterrent force may deter nuclear and 
full-scale conventional attack. It may also have some limited utility in the follow- ··· 
ing roles: compellence, coercive diplomacy, and protecting and enhancing foreign 
and strategic policy autonomy. Though the strategy of minimum deterrence ap-
pears cost-effective and attractive, it is seriously underdeveloped. What constitutes 
a minimum and how does one arrive at that figure? What are the survivability 
requirements necessary to reduce an adversary's temptation to strike first and one's 
own temptation to launch on warning? What sorts of deployment and command 
and control arrangements are required? Is minimum deterrence more suited for 
general deterrence than for inimediate deterrence? Is countervalue targeting ac-
ceptable, especially in democratic states? These questions require investigation. 
A subset of minimum deterrence is existential deterrence. Initially articulated 
in the context of the huge American and Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons in 
relation to Europe, the idea of existential deterrence is rooted in the belief that the 
very existence of a nuclear weapon stockpile would create considerable caution in 
relations among nuclear weapon states (Bundy 1983, 1984, 2004). Existential de-
terrence rests on the fear of uncertainty about what could happen, not on specific 
force structure or doctrine, or what has been declared as policy. It is not affected 
by changes in the balance of power except those that "might truly challenge the 
overall survivability of the forces on either side" (Bundy 1983: 9). Existential de-
terrence deters impersonally; no provocative threat is required; and it deters both 
sides simultaneously. Seen in this manner, existential deterrence is more a condi-
tion or outcome than a strategy. 
The idea of existential deterrence appears to have been adapted to the pres-
ent period as a basic deterrence strategy for states with opaque, small, or nascent 
nuclear forces with the purpose of inducing caution and deterring large-scale 
conventional or nuclear attack by posing the danger of nuclear escalation and · 
retaliation. In this conception, existential deterrence requires only the capability 
to carry out a simple, undifferentiated countervalue strike. A very small nuclear 
force would be sufficient for this purpose. For states that have not declared their 
nuclear weapon capabilities (India and Pakistan before 1998 and Israel), nuclear 
deterrence rests primarily on the perceived existence of nuclear capability than on 
declared intention or on relative capabilities (Hagerty 1998: 3). Existential deter-
rence would have no other purpose than protection of the homeland, although it 
could provide a certain measure of freedom in foreign policy and help mitigate 
the negative consequences of imbalance in conventional capability. Conceived in 
this manner, existential deterrence overlaps minimum deterrence and is likely to 
be the strategy of a weak or isolated state. Although presented as separate strat-
egies, existential deterrence, minimum deterrence, and assured retaliation can 
form part of a continuum, with the first two as way stations on the path to assured 
retaliation. 
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Extended Deterrence. The strategy of extended nuclear deterrence broadens the 
deterrence function of a nuclear arsenal to protect the homeland of an allied state 
against attack. The strategy usually suffers two credibility problems. One arises 
when the home territory of the deterring state is vulnerable to nuclear attack. 
Would a nuclear weapon state risk nuclear war to counter a threat to an ally if 
its own home territory were vulnerable to nuclear attack? This question was at 
the heart of the extended deterrence problem in Cold War Western Europe. The 
the vulnerability of the nuclear weapon state's homeland to nuclear attack, 
the less credible would be its extended deterrence commitment. The second cred-
ibility problem arises if the nuclear threat appears out of proportion to. the threat 
confronting an ally. Nuclear threats can deter only a narrow range of threats. 
Deterring nuclear threat will be more credible; deterring limited conventional at-
tack, low-intensity aggression, and chemical and biological attack by threatening 
nuclear retaliation is less credible. 
In both situations, the concern is how to make the extended deterrence com-
mitment credible. Measures to make extended deterrence commitments credible 
. include clear articulation of commitment, stationing troops and tactical nuclear 
weapons in allied countries, developing an ally's conventional capability to pre-
vent a fait accompli, integrating that capability with one's own to demonstrate 
escalation potential, developing and deploying BMD to protect the strategic assets 
of the nuclear weapon state and that of its ally, and demonstrating resolve through 
regular exercises and development of reputation. 
Strategies if Offense 
Offensive strategies exploit the threat value of nuclear weapons, the risk of nu-
clear war, and the use of force in an exemplary or controlled manner as a means of 
bargaining to achieve certain political outcomes. These include rolling back in-
fringements of the status quo, preventing or bringing about change in the status 
quo, calibrating means and ends in the pursuit oflimited political objectives without 
resorting to general war, and demonstrating political resolve to foe and friend. 
Although it relies on the threat of punishment as well, compellence-
unlike deterrence-demands change. The purpose of compellence is to demand 
compliance with a political demand and involves inducing action (acquiescence, 
retreat, or collaboration) through threat of punishment or exemplary use of force 
to indicate that more pain is in store if the adversary does not comply. A compel-
lent threat may be designed to intentionally involve some loss of control. Schelling 
labeled this "threats that leave something to chance." Citing the Cuban missile 
crisis, he posits that this kind of threat "is more impersonal, more external to the 
participants [and] the threat becomes part of the environment rather than a test of 
will between adversaries. The adversary may find it easier-less costly in prestige 
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or self-respect-to back away from a risky situation ... than from a threat that is . 
backed exclusively by ... resolve and determination" (Schelling 1966: 121n). Un-
like deterrence, compellence strategies must be designed for specific situations as 
they develop. 
A compellent strategy must have a definite objective, have a deadline that is.· 
near-term but allows sufficient time for the adversary to act, ensure that the threat . 
will not be carried out if the adversary acts accordingly, and provide a reasonable 
exit for the adversary. To be effective, a compellent strategy must have a high 
probability that the threat will be executed if the adversary does not meet the 
demand. 
Controlled Escalation and Limited War. Though these two strategies are often dis-
cussed separately, they have common premises and overlapping features of deter-
rence and compellence. Limited war and controlled escalation strategies assume . 
that deterrence of general nuclear war would continue to operate even after lower-
level conflict has been deliberately waged. By calibrating ends and means and re-
lying on intrawar deterrence, strategies of controlled escalation and limited war 
seek comparative advantage in a conflict by escalating the means and level of vio-
lence, crossing limits that previously constrained both sides, and threatening even 
greater risk and damage (Freedman 1983: 210-II). Controlled escalation and lim-
ited war presume a process of bargaining, concession, or further escalation based 
on deliberate decisions by belligerents. To be successful, these strategies require 
clear identification of interests and threats, calibrated responses, clear communi-
cation, implementation monitoring, and an exit strategy. These stringent require-
ments are not easily met, and the strategies could have unintended and opposing 
effects as demonstrated by the experience in the Vietnam War in which a strategy 
of controlled escalation was deliberately applied (Gaddis 2004). 
Strategies of Defense 
Counterforce is the only defensive role of nuclear weapons. If deterrence fails, 
nuclear weapons can be used to limit damage by destroying the enemy's strategic 
assets. Defense in a nuclear context, however, also includes BMD and conven-
tional defense. As with offense, there is no specific defense strategy. Depending 
on the threat and desired comprehensiveness, strategies of defense may be devel-
oped around one or more of three elements: counterforce damage limitation, con-
ventional defense, and defense against missile attacks. In light of earlier discussion, 
the consideration of counterforce and conventional defense in this subsection is 
brief. 
Counteiforce Damage Limitation. The purpose of a counterforce damage limitation 
strategy is to destroy the opponent's nuclear assets, other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and command and control facilities through a first strike (preventive or pre-
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eruptive), or second strike (retaliatory action) to reduce the damage from attacks 
by such weapons. A successful damage limitation strategy can prevent enemy at-
tacks on cities and its own strategic assets; hence it can be enormously useful. 
Glaser and Fetter (2005) argue that a fust-strike strategy risks precipitating early 
. launch by the enemy and undermining deterrence. A strategy that relies on retal-
iatory action does not undermine deterrence; targeting surviving nuclear forces 
avoids unnecessary use of nuclear weapons and prevents a large retaliatory strike 
by the enemy. A damage limitation strategy may be limited or comprehensive; the 
latter may include invasion to gain control of the enemy's strategic assets. 
Although more useful than the counterforce role in deterrence or in increas-
ing the leeway for foreign policy, the damage limitation counterforce strategy is 
not without drawbacks. A first-strike strategy can bring about an unnecessary 
nuclear war. A counterforce strategy that emphasizes prevention and preemption 
. could also provide an incentive for target states to launch first, making for an 
unstable crisis situation. With a second-strike strategy there is no certainty that 
it can destroy desired enemy targets. Some analysts claim that the costs outweigh 
the benefits and that a counterforce strategy can be destabilizing (Glaser and Fet-
ter 2005). Still others argue that counterforce missions and roles might work in 
the contemporary context against fledgling nuclear powers (Buchan et al. 2003: 
41-43). However, as with BMD, the advantage of counterforce is likely to be 
temporary and uncertain; over time the target country could presumably develop 
more survivable nuclear forces. In any case, attacking an adversary's nuclear forces 
with nuclear or conventional forces is a serious matter that most likely would re-
sult in a retaliatory strike. It carries much risk, is likely to undermine the taboo 
against the use of nuclear weapons, and could have negative political and military 
ramifications. 
Conventional Defense. The purpose of a conventional defense is to deny victory 
to the enemy if deterrence fails and to provide credible options in responding to 
enemy attack. The defense force must be able to stop and defeat limited conven-
tional intrusion as well as large-scale conventional attack, especially of the blitz-
krieg type, on home territory or that of allies. It also must have the capability to 
launch a counteroffensive to destroy and limit enemy capability or to regain lost 
value (such as territory). As indicated in earlier discussion, in a nuclear setting the 
size, purpose, and role of conventional forces and the strategy for their employ-
ment would necessarily be linked to and vary with nuclear policy and strategy. 
Ballistic Missile Defense. In the defense role, the purpose ofBMD is to destroy en-
emy missiles to defeat an enemy attack, and to protect and limit damage to a state's 
own strategic assets. BMD may also enhance deterrence by protecting strategic 
assets to secure the second-strike capability. The capability to reduce the vulner-
ability of the nuclear weapon state to nuclear attack and the capability to protect 
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strategic assets deployed overseas could also enhance the effectiveness of extended 
deterrence. BMD may also be a key component of an offensive strategy. With an 
effective defense shield, a state would be less deterred and may seriously contem-
plate attacks on other countries. 
BMD may comprise boost phase, midcourse, and terminal interceptors. And 
it may be limited and tactical or comprehensive and strategic. It may be designed 
to protect specific strategic assets, civilian populations, or both against a specifiC 
threat or a wide array of threats. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, for 
example, specifically allowed the deployment ofBMD for force protection in two 
sites. The Clinton administration pursued a limited ground-based midcourse sys-
tem designed to defend "the territory of the United States against limited ballistic 
missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)."13 North Korea 
was the country of most concern. Vide the 2002 NPR, the Bush administration 
proposed the development of an integrated, layered missile defense system with 
boost, midcourse, and terminal components. The idea is that if one layer of inter-
ceptors misses the target the next will have a second shot (Coyle 2006). Although 
public pronouncements still cite rogue states as the target, such a comprehensive 
system would appear to have broader ramifications as well. The United States and 
its allies (Japan, Taiwan, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] mem-
ber states) are also investing heavily in theater or tactical missile defense. 
From the foregoing discussion of roles and strategies for the employment of 
nuclear weapons, it is evident that strategies of deterrence are better grounded and 
developed than offensive and defensive strategies. Though intellectually attrac-
tive, there are practical limits to exploiting the threat potential of nuclear weapons 
for offensive purposes. This situation could alter dramatically if defense against 
ballistic missiles became effective. For the present, technological and other hur-
dles suggest that defense against nuclear threats is likely to be limited and rather 
easily countered. In this context, deterrence appears likely to continue to be the 
dominant purpose and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons. 
Security Implications 
Robert Jervis (1989: 23-45) identified several far-reaching security implica-
tions of mutual vulnerability arising from the possession of mutual second-strike 
capability: the impossibility of military victory and the perpetuation of peace, 
preservation of the status quo and the absence of peaceful change, stability and 
infrequent crises, high effectiveness of threats and the importance of commit-
ments and compromise, the salience of nuclear danger as opposed to the military 
balance, and a tenuous link between military balance and political outcomes. He 
concluded that evidence from the Cold War period generally confirms these prop-
ositions. The issue is whether these implications continue to be valid in the con-
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• temporary strategic environment. Taking into account the differences between 
the Cold War and the contemporary strategic situations, this section develops an 
; overview for exploring the security implications of nuclear weapons and strat~gies 
in the present period. Specifically it addresses the impact of nuclear weapons on 
. of power and alliance arrangements, bilateral and regional security 
.u•ru ........ ._.,, peace and stability, and dispute resolution. 
Structural Consequences 
The structural effects of nuclear weapons may be explored by investigating the 
implications of nuclear weapons for the balance of power, the balancing behavior 
·,of states, and the salience of alliance arrangements. 
.Power Balance. The term balance of power has many meanings.14 The focus here 
is on the impact of nuclear weapons on the distribution of power, which realists 
determines the material structure of the international system, with conse-
. quences for state behavior and system stability. A second focus is the imperative of 
.balancing in an anarchic system and the associated realist claim that weak states 
. balance strong ones through internal generation of power or through alliance 
·formation. 
On the distribution of power, a key question is what constitutes a pole. Although 
it is difficult to compute the power of nations and rank them, Hans Morgenthau 
and Kenneth Waltz assert that the rank of a state and whether it constitutes a pole 
· depends on how well it scores on all dimensions of power, not just one dimension 
or sector. Morgenthau identifies geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, 
military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of 
·diplomacy, and quality of government as key elements of national power (1978: 
117-55). Size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capa-
bility, military strength, political stability, and competence are the key attributes 
of power identified by Waltz (1979: 131). International influence as a pole, how-
ever, depends not only on material capabilities; it is also contingent on certain 
nonmaterial qualities such as vision, policy, and political will to translate brute 
power into authority and influence over other states in the system. 
Nuclear weapons may modify the military balance of power, but on their own 
they are unlikely to affect the overall distribution of power in the system. Nuclear 
weapons can affect the military balance by reducing or negating the potency of 
imbalance in conventional military capabilities. A small nuclear force can deter 
large-scale conventional and nuclear attacks by countries that are much stronger. 
This consideration underlies the claim that nuclear weapons, or more specifically 
the "balance of terror," equalize imbalances in military power. However, the 
equalizing effect operates only against specifiC adversaries and contingencies; it 
is not fungible like the defensive balance that is based on conventional military 
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capability.15 The military balance canceling effect of nuclear weapons does not 
alter the distribution of power at the system level unless nuclear weapon capabil-
ity is combined with other attributes of power. In the post-World War II era, for 
example, nuclear weapons sharpened the already existing bipolarity. They did 
not create it. China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964 but did not figure 
significantly in the regional balance of power until well into the 1980s after it had 
become politically more stable, its economy began growing rapidly, and resources 
were available to modernize its military. Though Russia continues to have a for-
midable nuclear weapon capability, it is not considered a superpower or a pole 
today. Until its recent economic resurgence, Russia was not even taken seriously 
as a regional power in Asia. For change in the distribution of power, concurrent 
growth is required in several key attributes of power, and the state concerned 
should be willing to exercise that power in pursuit of a particular vision. Nuclear . 
weapon capability adds to national military power, but by itself does not alter the 
ranking of a state or the distribution of power in the system. 
Balancing Behavior. As with the distribution of power, nuclear weapons need not 
have a significant impact on the imperative of balancing in an anarchic inter-
national system. They may make internal balancing more possible and desirable 
than external balancing, but do not obviate the need for external balancing. Inter-
nal balancing is more possible and preferable for several reasons. First, even small 
nuclear forces can deter aggression (conventional and nuclear) by much stronger 
countries. Because it is easier to exploit the danger of nuclear war and to sustain 
a retaliatory force than to ensure a successful disarming first strike or an effec-
tive defense against nuclear weapons, superior nuclear capability (advantage in the 
ability to inflict retaliatory damage) is less likely to affect political outcomes when 
vital interests are at stake. Nuclear weapons can reduce the fear of abandonment, 
eliminate the concern about the commitment credibility of a nuclear weapon 
ally, and make states more self-reliant in ensuring their survival. Second, nuclear 
weapons do not add up in the same way as conventional capability and are much 
less fungible; that is, potency ceases to increase with numbers beyond a certain 
point (unlike with conventional weapons). Destructive power beyond a certain 
level (when parties to a conflict have a secure second-strike capability that can 
inflict unacceptable damage) is politically and strategically irrelevant. Third, alli-
ances among nuclear weapon states may also complicate and limit the flexibility in 
nuclear planning by smaller states (a version of the fear of entrapment). However, 
the decision of a state to forego external balancing depends on its nuclear capabil-
ity and the security contingencies it has to cover. A nascent nuclear weapon state 
that still has not developed a reliable retaliatory capability would find it useful 
to ally with a nuclear weapon state that can extend the deterrence function of its 
nuclear arsenal. Broader political and economic considerations may also make for 
alliances among nuclear weapon states. Nuclear Britain continued the alliance 
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. relationship with the United States, France developed its own nuclear force and 
pulled out of nuclear NATO but remained a member of NATO, and China stra-
tegically aligned with the United States until the early 1980s. 
Salience of Alliances. Balance of power informed by consideration of threat pro-
vides the rationale for alliance formation (Walt 1987). Alliances and alignments 
combine the power of states to confront a powerful adversary. They may also 
serve broader functions that go beyond purely military considerations. As ob-
served earlier, nuclear weapons could reduce the salience of allies in military 
balancing because they make internal balancing more possible and attractive in 
certain situations. However, this consideration does not make alliances irrelevant. 
Although allies could not affect the strategic balance, alliances were considered 
important during the Cold War. Allied countries, especially large ones such as 
Japan and several NATO countries, did matter in many other attributes of power. 
Alliances not only extend the power and influence of the dominant partner; they 
can assist in the construction of a preferred order, allow for shared responsibilities, 
and balance the conventional military capability of an aspiring hegemon. 
· For nonnuclear weapon states, alliance with a nuclear weapon state that can 
provide security support or a guarantee makes eminent security sense, although 
·the credibility issue can argue against relying on the nuclear guarantee of an-
other state when that state itself is vulnerable to nuclear attack. Through a nuclear 
guarantee, the nuclear weapon state can discourage nuclear proliferation and also 
influence allies. Smaller countries obtain voice opportunities through alliances, 
which could also be a means for constraining the alliance lead power. For these 
and other reasons, alliances were important during the Cold War. Would alliances 
among nuclear weapon states and between nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states 
continue to be important in the contemporary unipolar world? This question 
is explored in Chapter 18, with specific reference to the U.S.-centered alliance 
system in Asia. It will also be useful to explore if and how the development of 
nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan has affected the China-Pakistan strategic 
alignment and Pakistan's security relationship with the United States. 
Security Interaction Consequences 
A key consequence of the transforming effect of nuclear weapons is the eleva-
tion of deterrence to center stage in national security policy and the relative de-
dine in the salience of defense and offense. How this affects security interaction 
may be investigated by exploring its consequences for regional peace and stability 
and dispute resolution. 
Cold JVar Experience: Relative Peace and Strategic Stability. The impossibility of mil-
itary victory in a total war in a situation of mutual vulnerability has been cited as a 
cause of the unprecedented "long peace" between the two superpowers since 1945 
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(Jervis 1989: 23-24). Although other reasons (bipolarity, political and economic 
modernization, and satisfaction of the two superpowers with the status quo) may 
also have contributed to the long peace, it is unclear if they, on their own, can 
account for the Soviet-American peace.16 It is difficult to apportion responsibility, · 
but it is unlikely that mutual vulnerability was unimportant. It is more likely that 
the different factors reinforced each other. 
Jervis argues that nuclear weapons enhanced stability because they favor pres-: 
ervation of the status quo. Traditionally the threat and use of military force have 
been deployed along with other instruments to alter the status quo through war. 
Because of the mutual vulnerability of the two superpowers, nuclear weapons were . 
more relevant during the Cold War in the deterrence role than in the coercive 
diplomacy or forcible use roles. Further, the state protecting a firmly entrenched 
status quo through deterrence enjoys certain bargaining advantages. Jervis (1989: 
29-35) argues that the status quo country has a higher stake and therefore higher 
resolve in defending it; and the country seeking to alter the status quo bears the 
onus of moving fmt, knowing full well that its action could cause a conflict to es-
calate to a full-scale war. The status quo advantage applied in the prenuclear era as 
well. Nuclear weapons have magnified the effect. A firmly established status quo 
in the nuclear era favors the state practicing deterrence and is difficult to alter. 
Crisis should also be infrequent in a condition of mutual, secure second-strike 
capability and when the status quo is firm (Jervis 1989: 35-38). Prenuclear causes 
of crisis, such as adventures in the expectation of victory and defection by sig-
nificant allies that could change the distribution of power, are not valid in a situ-
ation of mutual vulnerability where security is provided by secure second-strike 
capability. The Cuban missile crisis occurred when the Soviets were weak and 
still seeking parity. Although there were conflicts on the periphery since then, 
they did not generate a crisis between the superpowers. As long as both sides 
were satisfied with the status quo, generating a crisis to gain something was not 
attractive enough to outweigh the costs. Should a crisis occur in the nuclear era, 
it will not be due to misreading enemy military strength as in the past; it will be 
based on the importance of the issue at stake, each state's willingness to run risks, 
and judgment of each other's resolve. Mutual vulnerability and the desire to avoid 
undesirable outcomes also provided incentives for Soviet-American cooperation. 
Such cooperation was designed to strengthen strategic stability and reduce the risk 
of unintended war. 
However, it was feared that stability at the strategic level would make it safe 
to engage in lower-level violence. The stability-instability paradox rested on the 
belief that the mutual possession of second-strike capability lowers the probability 
that conventional wars will escalate to the nuclear level.17 The low likelihood of 
escalation (termed strategic stability) makes conventional war less dangerous, open-
ing up space for limited war and other lower levels of violence in the pursuit of 
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· political goals. However, as Jervis notes, because escalation can occur, mutual 
· .· .·second-strike capability does not make the world safe for major provocations and 
limited wars. A requirement of U.S. strategy during the Cold War was to set in 
.. · .. train a process that reconnected nuclear retaliation to conventional aggression. 
Despite fear of a Soviet blitzkrieg-type attack in Europe, the two superpowers 
.studiously avoided conventional conflict with each other, fearing that such con-
flicts could escalate to the nuclear level. 
Relevance for the Contemporary Era. The claim that nuclear weapons contribute 
to peace and strategic stability is grounded almost exclusively in the Cold War 
context of the two superpowers' mutual vulnerability. Would nuclear weapons 
have a similar effect in the contemporary nuclear context? There are two issues 
··to consider here. One relates to the condition of asymmetry and the small size of 
the nuclear force of many states in the Asian security region. Can small nuclear 
deter each other, and can they deter stronger nuclear powers? Can stabil-
ity be achieved with small nuclear forces? Would the risk of escalation to nuclear 
war make conventional war and low-intensity violence more likely among newer 
nuclear weapon states and undermine stability? The second issue relates to deter-
rence dominance. Does the development of missile defense in combination with 
a nuclear counterforce role undermine deterrence dominance and increase the 
space for offense by states with such capabilities? 
Small Nuclear Forces and Deterrence. The premise that nuclear danger induces un-
certainty and caution among nuclear weapon states underscores the thinking that 
.. small nuclear forces can deter aggressive action by other small nuclear powers as 
well as those by superior ones. Bundy (2004) argued that it did not take a huge 
. stockpile of nuclear weapons or an assured destruction capability to deter even a 
formidable adversary like the Soviet Union. The strategies of minimum and exis-
tential deterrence rely on this premise. Kenneth Waltz (1995) forcefully makes the 
case that small nuclear forces can deter each other and also deter stronger nuclear 
powers. Arguing that a low probability of destructive attack is sufficient for deter-
rence, he posits that the requirements of effective deterrence-second-strike ca-
pability, avoiding launch on warning and on false signals, and effective command 
and control arrangements-can be satisfied by new nuclear weapon states with 
small nuclear forces and that nuclear threat by weaker countries is highly credible. 
What counts is not the balance of force but the balance of resolve, which hinges 
on the issue at stake (defense of the homeland for the weaker states) and the fear 
that aggressive action will invite nuclear retaliation. 
This line of thinking is countered by those who argue that the requirements 
of stable deterrence cannot be satisfied by the new nuclear weapon states because 
military officers view preventive war in a positive light and are not interested in 
constructing invulnerable strategic forces; they also argue that the nuclear arsenals 
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of the newer nuclear weapon states are more prone to accidental and unauthor- · 
ized use (Sagan 1995). A critical difference (not just between Waltz and Sagan, but 
between Waltz and his other critics as well) centers on the requirement of a secure 
second-strike capability. For assured retaliationists, effective deterrence entails 
certainty of retaliation and the capability to inflict a level of damage that is de- · 
fined as unacceptable. For Waltz, the uncertainty and risk of nuclear war, and the 
perception that even a few bombs can inflict a high level of damage, are sufficient 
for deterrence to be effective. Even a slight chance that a provocation could lead 
to nuclear war is sufficient to deter all but the most highly motivated adversary 
(Bundy 1983). Robert Powell (2003: 101) argues that resolve is the key issue. When 
the balance of resolve favors· a small nuclear power, it can deter a larger nuclear 
power. Even when the balance of resolve is ambiguous, if the smaller state is will-
ing to run a higher risk, it can deter the larger nuclear power. 
Small Nuclear Forces, Peace, and Stability. Building on the argument that small nu- . 
clear forces can deter like forces and even superior ones, Waltz posits that the · 
spread of nuclear weapons to more states is not destabilizing. It can advance peace, 
security, and stability (Waltz 1995). He supports this assertion with these points: 
Nuclear weapons help ensure the security of states in an international system 
based on self-help; small nuclear forces will not affect the strategic balance; nuclear 
weapons reduce the chance of war by making miscalculation difficult and increas-
ing the cost of war; and new nuclear weapon states will feel the same constraints 
that have been experienced by the older ones. The combination of nuclear deter-
rence and conventional defense eliminated war among advanced states in their 
core area of interest, but the proliferation of conventional weapons has sustained 
and possibly increased the incidence of wars on the periphery, making violence 
the privilege of the strong against the weak and among the weak and the poor. 
The gradual spread of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, will decrease the in-
cidence of war among the new states as well. 
. Analysts who argue that organizational pathologies, technological shortcom-
mgs, geographic proximity, intense disputes and distrust, and small nuclear arse-
nals in~rease volatility in the already conflict-prone regions contest such reassuring 
analysls (Feaver 1992/3, 1993; Sagan 1994, 1995). Some take this critique a step 
further by claiming that, instead of inducing caution and reducing the incidence 
of conventional war, the danger of nuclear war can make conflict among newer 
nuclear weapon states more likely (Kapur 2006: 10). Rather than restrain behav-
ior, the introduction of nuclear danger makes the world a more violent place. 
Earlier, Jervis argued that the advantage favoring the status quo in the nuclear era 
may not hold when the status quo is ambiguous or when a revisionist state has the 
power to implement its threats with little cost or danger, has high resolve, and sees 
the domestic or international situation as precarious enough to merit great risk 
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cost (Jervis 1989: 32-34). Along these lines but in a more detailed fashion, 
context of new nuclear powers and drawing on Pakistan's behavior in the 
conflict over Kashmir in the post-1990 period (de facto and overt nuclear periods), 
Kapur {2006: 42-43) argues that nuclear weapons may provide incentives 
·•· for a weaker, revisionist state to engage in limited conventional military action 
to alter the status quo. Such a state would not engage in aggressive behavior in a 
conventional world because it would most likely result in failure. 
In a nuclear world, the stronger state is inhibited from'employing its full mil-
itary might against a weaker state because of the fear of escalation to nuclear 
war. This risk of escalation emboldens a highly motivated weaker state .to behave 
aggressively. Kapur advances two reasons why a weak, revisionist state might en-
gage in conventional aggression (zoo6: 45). First, conventional military aggression 
. can forcefully alter the territorial status quo while the nuclear weapons of the 
weaker state deter full-scale conventional retaliation by the stronger adversary. 
Second, conventional military action can trigger a highly visible international 
crisis, which can be used by the weaker state to seek favorable international diplo-
matic intervention and an outcome favorable to itself. 
That nuclear weapons enable weaker states to punch above their weight is dif-
ficult to refute. Kapur's line of argument is not without merit, but it can be rebut-
ted on several counts. One, behaving aggressively carries high costs-although 
escalation concerns may reduce the military cost, the political, diplomatic, and 
economic costs can be considerable. Repeated adventurism is counterproductive. 
Second, it is unlikely that such aggressive behavior could in fact bring about 
meaningful change in the status quo. If the stakes are high enough, the stronger 
status quo party will resort to full-scale conventional retaliation. The onus of es-
calating to the nuclear level then shifts to the conventionally weaker, revisionist 
state that initiated the crisis. Third, there is no certainty that international diplo-
matic intervention would favor the revisionist state. It could work against it. The 
net effect could still favor the status quo state. Finally, it is possible to argue that, as 
in the Cuban missile crisis, a long view of the 1999 and 2002 crises in South Asia 
would demonstrate the limited utility of nuclear weapons in altering the status 
quo through force and the danger of such behavior and thus constrain future ac-
tion by the affected states. I will further develop this argument in Chapter 18. 
Is Deterrence Dominance Eroding? The assertions that small nuclear forces can de-
ter other nuclear weapon states, including those with much stronger nuclear ar-
senals, and that they can contribute to peace, security, and stability are based 
on the premise that nuclear weapons favor deterrence dominance. However, if 
defense against nuclear weapons becomes effective, the assumption of mutual 
vulnerability would not hold, deterrence dominance would be undermined, and 
the relationship between force and statecraft among nuclear weapon states would 
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undergo substantial change. As Waltz states, the logic of strategic defense is that 
conventional weaponry. It reintroduces the defense/offense race (Waltz 2004). 
all sides have impregnable defenses, according to Waltz, the world has been made 
safe for World War III. Effective ballistic missile defense and the development of a 
nuclear counterforce capability would undermine deterrence dominance and the 
stability that is based o~ it. Growing possibility and effectiveness of offense · 
creases the prospects for opportunistic expansionism, the incentive to strike fnst, 
and arms racing. Increasing effectiveness of defense against nuclear threats intro- • 
duced many uncertainties. 
Currently, only the United States and its allies are actively pursuing a missile 
defense capability with the stated purpose of defending against threats posed by 
rogue states, increasing the credibility of extended deterrence, and reducing the 
incentive for proliferation by U.S. allies. Through its new triad, Washington is. 
seeking to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons but increase their tactical role. 
Should all these efforts succeed, the vulnerability of the United States to attack 
by other nuclear weapon states would decline, allowing it greater freedom to 
engage in offensive operations (preventive, preemptive, and limited war) against 
them. To be operationally meaningful, however, U.S. vulnerability must decline 
greatly, possibly to zero before decision makers can have sufficient confidence to 
employ offensive and defensive strategies. 
At the same time, even a marginal increase in effectiveness would create con-
cern in target countries about the effectiveness of their strategic deterrent. They · 
may seek better force protection, build additional missiles and decoys, and de-
velop other countermeasures such as multiple warhead missiles to overwhelm and 
penetrate the U.S. defense system, and in a crisis situation they may attack the 
defense system to limit its effectiveness or destroy it. They might also engage in 
the development of their own missile defense systems. Probably only Russia and 
China have the capability to move in these directions. Other target states would 
likely disperse and hide their nuclear arsenals to create uncertainty in the minds 
of U.S. decision makers as to whether they can destroy the entire arsenal of those · 
states in a fnst strike. In light of continuing technological limitations reflected 
in the partial success of tests and limited deployment, and the relative ease with 
which a retaliatory capability can be sustained, it appears that deterrence domi-
nance would continue to prevail. Uncertainty and the danger of nuclear war are 
likely to create cautious relations among nuclear weapon states, although they 
may not prevent all violence. 
Nuclear Superiority. Unless defense becomes more effective, superiority in nuclear 
capability may not confer military or diplomatic advantage on strong nuclear 
weapon states in their interaction with lesser nuclear weapon states. During the 
Cold War, although superiority in numbers appears to have been a consideration 
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in the strategies of the two superpowers at certain points in time, it does not 
·appear to have been consequential, especially after both had developed secure 
second-strike capabilities. One lesson of the Cold War was that political outcomes 
. had little or no connection to the strategic balance. Differences in capability did 
. not seem to have affected the security behavior of lesser nuclear weapon states. 
The security relationships of these states were shaped in large measure by the 
dispute at stake and the resolve of the conflicting parties as the Soviet Union 
discovered in the military clashes with China in 1969. However, the certainty of 
massive retaliation by a more powerful adversary when provoked can be expected 
to limit the range of goals and options available to a smaller nuclear. weapon state 
·• and restrain its behavior. 
Nuclear weapons do not seem to have conferred any defmite advantage to 
nuclear weapon states in their dealings with nonnuclear weapon states. The huge 
American nuclear arsenal, for example, did not deter North Vietnam. For anum-
ber of reasons, the United States was constrained in using its nuclear capability. 
Bundy (2004) disputes the claim that the threat of nuclear war had any impact on 
. the 1953 Korean armistice agreement or the 1946 Soviet withdrawal from Iran. He 
argues that since the 1958 Taiwan crisis pertaining to the offshore islands, nuclear 
threats have not featured in regional conflicts and that possession of nuclear ca-
pability did not confer diplomatic and military advantage, as nonnuclear weapon 
states were not deterred. Vietnam invaded Cambodia, which was supported by 
China; and China attacked Vietnam, which was backed by the Soviet Union. 
Nuclear Weapons and Resolution of Disputes 
Although nuclear weapons contributed to Soviet-American peace and strategic 
stability, they did not bring about resolution of disputes or prevent all forms of 
violence. Some, including Jervis, identify this as a weakness of deterrence theoriz-
ing, which focused almost exclusively on threats and demonstrating resolve in a 
conflict situation. It did not focus on rewards or compromise to ease tensions and 
bring about conflict settlement. Nuclear weapons also prevented the traditional 
use of military force along with other instruments of policy to resolve disputes 
on the battlefield. Consequently, the security interaction of the two superpowers 
remained "frozen," preventing the resolution of disputes through peaceful means 
or through the use of force, as would have happened in the prenuclear era Qervis 
1989: 29-32). The absence of change is also attributed to the bargaining advan-
tages enjoyed by the side defending a fumly established status quo. 
However, to argue that nuclearization or mutual vulnerability prevents the 
resolution of disputes is to conflate cause and symptom. Nuclear weapons are not 
the cause of political disputes. Although nuclear weapons may nave negated con-
flict resolution through the use of force, conflicts could still have been addressed 
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peacefully through negot1at1ons and other means as long as the parties were 
amenable to bridging differences through compromise. The Cold War came to 
a peaceful end despite the situation of mutual vulnerability. Domestic political 
change in the Soviet Union was a principal factor in terminating the Cold War. 
The debates over the implications of nuclear weapons-deterrence effective-
ness of small nuclear forces and their contribution to peace and stability-are 
grounded largely in abstract reasoning, the Cold War experience, or refutation 
of that experience. More empirical work is required to develop and substantiate 
claims. This, however, is made difficult because the effectiveness of deterrence 
and its contribution to stability are not easy to demonstrate; because of limited 
real-world cases and experience; the tendency to downplay the significance and 
role of nuclear weapons; and the high confidentiality and lack of transparency in 
Asian countries on matters associated with nuclear weapon capabilities, strategies, 
interaction, and outcomes. Nevertheless, more empirical work is becoming avail-
able especially on the India-Pakistan relationship during the crises at the turn of 
the twenty-first century. This book seeks to contribute to this by making it possi-
ble to advance stronger empirically grounded statements on the purposes and roles 
of national nuclear forces and to offer broad observations on their implications for 
regional security dynamics, peace, stability, and conflict resolution. 
Notes 
I. The Absolute Weapon is the title of the book by Bernard Brodie and others (1946) that 
examines the implications of atomic power for world order. 
2. Cited in Trachtenberg (1989: 304). It should be noted here that Brodie subsequently 
changed his view. He wrote an introductory essay titled "The Continuing Relevance of 
'On War"' for the publication of Clausewitz's "On War" in English (Brodie 1976). See 
also Brodie (1973, Chap. 9). 
3· Schelling (1966: 7) posits that the distinction between use and threat of force does 
not effectively capture the change brought about by nuclear weapons. 
4- Forces and weapon systems developed for deterrence were no longer useful in de-
fense in the sense that they could not guarantee that a nuclear-armed state could not retali-
ate and inflict unimaginable devastation. Nuclear weapons also negated the potential for 
war mobilization that was important in earlier periods. Nuclear war would be fought and 
decided with the arsenal in place. See Brodie (1946: 88-90). Urban-industrial centers con-
tinued to be important targets, however, not because of their economic and war potential, 
but as hostages in coercive warfare. 
.S- The discussion of political ends draws on the realist paradigm, which assigns state 
violence a central role in these quests. 
6. On international order, see Alagappa 2003. 
7- Thomas Schelling introduced the term compellence (Schelling 1966). 
8. George and Simon (1994) first employed the term coercive diplomacy in 1970. George 
(2004) distinguishes coercive diplomacy from compellence. 
9- On conventional deterrence, see Mearsheimer (1983) and Huntington (1982). 
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10. On the waves or evolution of deterrence thinking, see Jervis (1979), Freedman (1983), 
Morgan (2003). Freedman (2004) documents the rise and decline of deterrence. 
II. The discussion of the strategy of massive retaliation draws on Dulles (1954), Kauff-
(1956), and Freedman (1983). 
12. Because the term assured retaliation was perceived as bland, the strategy was labeled 
as "assured destruction" in order to convey the intentional nature of the retaliatory threat 
to highlight the harsh consequences that would follow. The new label was also in-
to convey an image of toughness to the American right (Freedman 1983: 246). 
:H"w"w'r the term assured retaliation is more accurate as a concept and strategy. 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999, quoted in Glaser and Fetter (2001: 46). 
14. On the many meanings of balance of power see Claude (1962), Haas (1953), Mor-
(!978), and Sheehan (1996). 
Ij. On balance of terror, deterrent balance, and defensive balance, see Snyder (1961: 
On alternative explanations for the long peace, see Mueller (1988) and Waltz (1979). 
On the stability-instability paradox, see Snyder (1961) and Jervis (1989: 19-22). 
References 
Alagappa, Muthiah. 2003. "The Study oflnternational Order: An Analytical Framework." 
, In Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Rajesh M. 2006. Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 
Betts, Richard. 2000. "Is Strategy an Illusion? International Security 25 (2): s-so. 
·:.D>Ur<Ien, William L. 1946. There Will Be No Time: The Revolution in Strategy. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Bernard. 1946. "War in the Atomic Age'" and "Implications for Military Policy." 
In The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, Frederick S. Dunn, Bernard 
Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, and William T. R. Fox. New York: Har-
court, Brace. 
1959. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
c:; ____ 1973. War and Politics. London: Cassell. 
1976. "The Continuing Relevance of 'On War."' Introductory essay to Carl Von 
Clausewitz, On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Buchan, Glenn C., David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic. 2003. Future 
Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND. 
McGeorge. 1983. "The Bishops and the Bomb." New York Review of Books 30 
(ro): 3-8 . 
---. 1984. "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences." In The Security Gamble: 
Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, ed. Douglas MacLean. Totowa, N J.: Rowman 
& Allanheld. 
---. 2004. "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy." In The Use of Force: 
· Military Power and International Politics, ed. Robert]. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz. Boul-
der, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
ro6 MUTH1AH ALAGAPPA 
Claude, I. 1962. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. 1976. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter·. 
Paret. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. . 
Coyle, Philip. 2006. The Limits and Liabilities cif Missile Difense. Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Defense Information. Available online at www.Ciaonet.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/wps/ 
cdio22.html. 
Dulles, John Foster. 1954. "Policy for Security and Peace." Foreign Affairs 32 (3): 353-64. 
Enthoven, Alain C., and Wayne K. Smith. 1971. How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Difense 
Program, 1961-1969. New York: Harper and Row. 
Feaver, Peter. 1992/3. "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations." Inter- . 
national Security 17 (3): 160-87. 
1993. "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations." Security 
Studies 2 (3/4): 159-91. 
Freedman, Lawrence. 1983. The Evolution cif Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
---. 2004. Dete"ence. Malden, Mass.: Polity. 
Friedberg, Aaron L. 1982. "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'-1945-1981." In . 
The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security, ed. Samuel P. Huntington. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. 2004. "Implementing Flexible Response: Vietnam as a Test Case." In · 
The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, ed. Robert]. Art and Kenneth 
N. Waltz. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
George, Alexander L. 2004. "Coercive Diplomacy." In The Use for Force, ed. Robert]. Art 
and Kenneth N. Waltz. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
George, Alexander L., and William E. Simons, eds. 1994. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Glaser, Charles L., and Steve Fetter. 2001. "National Missile Defense and the Future of .. 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy." International Security 26 (1): 40-92. 
---. 2005. "Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New 
Missions." International Security 30 (2): 84-126. 
Goldstein, Avery. 2000. Deterrence and Security in the 21St Century. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
Haas, Ernst B. 1953. "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" 
World Politics 5 (4): 442-77. 
Hagerty, Devin T. 1998. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Hertz, John. 1950. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." In World Politics, 
2 (January 1950): 157-80. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1982. "The Renewal of Strategy." In The Strategic Imperative: New 
Policies for American Security, ed. Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under Anarchy." World Politics 30 (2): 167-214. 
---. 1979. "Deterrence Theory Revisited." World Politics 31 (2): 289-324. 
---. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect cif Armageddon. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Exploring Roles 107 
Herman. 1961. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. 
S. Paul. 2006. Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict ir1 South 
Asia. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
;A<tuurrn:an, William W. 1956. "The Requirements of Deterrence." In Military Policy and 
National Security, ed. William W. Kauffman. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press. 
Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper 
Brothers. 
Mearsheimer, John. 1983. Conventional Dete"ence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
, Patrick M. 2003. Deterrence Now. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
1Vltlellter,John. 1988. "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Post-
war World." International Security 13 (2): 55-79. 
Paul, T.V. 1998. "Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons." In The Absolute Weapon Revis-
ited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, T. V. Paul, Richard]. Harknett, 
and James]. Wirtz, eds. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Barry R. 1984. The Sources cif Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between 
World Wars. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Powell, Robert. 2003. "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National 
Missile Defense." International Security 27 (4): 86-II8. 
Sagan, Scott D. 1994. "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence The-
ory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." International Security r8 (4): 66-107. 
.---. 1995. "More Will Be Worse." In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. 
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. New York: W. W. Norton. 
;·Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy cif Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. 
1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
2006. "Nuclear Deterrence for the Future." Issues in Science and Technology 23 (r): 
so-s2. 
Sheehan, Michael. 1996. The Balance of Power: History and Theories. New York: Routledge. 
Snyder, Glenn H. 1961. Deterrence and Difense: Toward a Theory of National Security. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1989. "Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966." Political Science 
Quarterly 104 (2): 301-34. 
Walt, Stephen. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. 
---. 1995. "More May Be Better." In The Spread cif Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. 
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. New York: W. W. Norton. 
---. 2004. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities." In The Use cif Force: Military Power 
and International Politics, ed. Robert ]. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz. Boulder, Colo.: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
